REPUBLIC OF
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL
Mag. App. No.
56 of 2001
BETWEEN
AND
ANTHONY SPRINGER
MR. K. KAMTA appeared
on behalf of the APPELLANT
MR. C. BHOLA appeared on behalf of the RESPONDENT
DATE DELIVERED:
July 23rd 2001
Judgment
Delivered by M.A. de la Bastide, C.J.
The entry in question was one which related to a consignment of oil filters from Florida and the allegation was that the name of the consignor was falsely stated on the duty entry which was prepared by the appellant’s agent on its instructions.
May I say that complaint has been made by counsel for the appellant that the charge as laid did not give any particulars of the falsity which was alleged. That criticism is well made and the appellant would certainly have been entitled to particulars had they been requested, but particulars were not requested, and it is obvious that there was no unfairness suffered as a result. No complaint was made at the trial and the evidence would have soon disclosed to the appellant and its attorney the particular respect in which the duty entry was alleged to have been false.
The name of the consignor was stated on the duty entry as ‘David Ballard and Co. Inc.’ In the invoice which supported the duty entry the consignor was again shown as ‘David Ballard and Co. Inc.,’ and, an address was given of ‘150 Homestead, Florida, 33071, USA.’ Evidence was led at the trial from two witnesses who came from Florida. One was a Mr. Ravel, who was employed in the Government department in which records are kept of all corporations doing business in Florida. In fact, the records in his custody cover all entities doing business in Florida, since a licence is required for the conducting of any business. He testified that ‘David Ballard and Co. Inc.’ did not appear in any of those records.
Evidence was also given from a Mr. Mark Gibson, the Postmaster General of Homestead. He testified that there was no such address as No. 115 Homestead, and moreover the zip code 33071 was not the zip code of Homestead, but of Coral Springs.
The submission was made to us by counsel for the appellant that the evidence which suggested that the address was incorrect was not relevant or admissible as the offence created by Section 2 (12)(a) was only committed if something in the entry itself was shown to be false and the address of the consignor was not shown on the entry. Even assuming that the Prosecution could not rely on the falsity of the address shown in the invoice in order to establish the offence, it was in our view highly relevant for the purpose of showing that the purported consignor was in fact a fictitious entity to lead evidence that the address which was attributed to that entity, was itself fictitious.
The evidence to which I refer created a strong inference, to say the least, that ‘David Ballard and Co. Inc.’ did not exist or at any rate, if it did exist, it did not exist in Florida as a trading company. Finally, if it did exist somewhere in the United States as a trading company, it was not the consignor of these goods. That was a very strong inference to be drawn from the evidence of Mr. Ravel and Mr. Gibson.
The Managing Director of the appellant, Mr. Eugene Dunn, gave evidence. The thrust of his evidence was that arrangements for the purchase of the oil filters which were the subject of the duty entry, had been made by buying agents in Florida, and that the appellant had not actually had any direct contact with this entity, ‘David Ballard and Co. Inc.’
This evidence, however, was seriously undermined by an affidavit which had been sworn previously by Mr. Dunn in which he contradicted that, and claimed to have himself dealt with ‘David Ballard and Co. Inc.’ Attempts by counsel in the court below to suggest that there was in fact no contradiction between the affidavit and his oral evidence, were not impressive.
What Mr. Dunn notably failed to do was to give any evidence of any attempt made by the appellant through their buying agent to identify the whereabouts of David Ballard and Co. Inc. or to get any information about them. The only reasonable inference to be drawn from their failure to do so was that they knew full well that that company did not exist.
On this state of the evidence there was every justification for the Magistrate to have convicted the appellant of this offence. In fact there was no other reasonable conclusion to which she could have come, other than that the consignor’s name was a fiction, and that the duty entry was, therefore, false in that respect. An attempt was made by counsel before us to argue that the charge was laid out of time on the basis that the relevant period of limitation was six months, whereas the charge was laid about eleven months after the offence. He relied on Section 246 of the Customs Act. This provides among other things that offences under the Customs laws may be prosecuted summarily. He asked us therefore, to apply to such proceedings the six-month restriction which exists for the bringing of summary proceedings generally.
The trouble with that argument is that it is immediately confronted by Section 247 which provides: “Proceedings under the Customs laws may be commenced at any time within seven years after the date of the offence.” Nothing daunted counsel sought to persuade us that Section 247 should be interpreted as applying only to proceedings for condemnation which are dealt with in Section 6(1). There is absolutely no basis whatever for so construing Section 247 and limiting its language in that way. It clearly applies to these proceedings and the point therefore fails.
For these reasons we hold that there is no merit in this appeal and we affirm the conviction and the fine of $12,000 which was imposed. The appellant must pay the costs of this appeal to be taxed in default of agreement.
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